Game Theory and Applications Volume 4 by unknown
Game Theory and Applications
Volume 4 (1998)
On a Partial Information Multiple Selection Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–10
K. Ano
Abstract
We consider a variation of the so-called partial information optimal selection
problem. The buyer desires to buy an item at as low a price as possible based on a
finite sequence of price quotations obtained sequentially from various sellers. After
each price quotation is received, the buyer must decide either to select the price or
not. It is assumed that the buyer is allowed to make at most m(≥ 1) selections.
The buyer can hold at most m prices and can buy at the lowest price among m
prices with the objective of maximizing the probability of buying the good at the
lowest price among all of N prices. It is understand that when the distribution of
price quotations is completely known, the optimal rule is the one-stage look-ahead
rule for both the single selection and the multiple selection problem. We show in
this article that the one-stage look-ahead stopping rule for the multiple selection
problem is still optimal in some cases where the price distribution has unknown
parameter(s) and the buyer’s prior on this parameter undergoes Bayesian updating
as successive prices are received. From the point of view of a Game theory, this is
regarded as an one person game problem.
The Normalized Banzhaf Value and the Banzhaf
Share Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11–31
R. van den Brink and G. van den Laan
Abstract
A cooperative game with transferable utilities –or simply a TU-game– describes a
situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A value func-
tion for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution
of payoffs over the players in the game. A famous solution concept for TU-games is
the Banzhaf value. This Banzhaf value is not efficient , i.e., in general it does not
distribute the payoff that can be obtained by the ‘grand coalition’ consisting of all
players cooperating together.
In this paper we consider the normalized Banzhaf value which distributes the
payoff that can be obtained by the ‘grand coalition’ proportional to the Banzhaf
values of the players. This value does not satisfy certain axioms underlying the
Banzhaf value. In this paper we discuss some characterizations of the normalized
Banzhaf value and compare these with other solution concepts such as, for example,
the (non-normalized) Banzhaf value and the Shapley value.
Another approach to analyze efficient value functions is to consider share func-
tions being functions which assign to every player in a TU-game its share in the
worth of the ‘grand coalition’. We discuss the characterization of a class of such
share functions containing the Banzhaf and Shapley share functions.
Finally, we generalize the concept of the potential function of a game as intro-
duced by Hart and Mas-Colell to a class of potential functions and characterize any
element of the class of share functions by the normalized marginal function of the
corresponding potential function.
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite
Cooperative TU Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32–44
I. Dragan
Abstract
In this paper, the Dubey/Neyman/Weber semivalues for finite cooperative TU
games are considered. The Power Game for semivalues as an extension of the
Power Game for the Banzhaf value is introduced. The Power Game in terms of the
coalitional form of the game is given. A potential is defined. Furthermore, it is
shown that a semivalue is the Shapley value of the Power Game, and a recursive
definition of the semivalues using the potential is given. The characterization of
semivalue by means of consistency and weighted standardness is proved.
The Greedy Bankruptcy Game: an Alternative Game
Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45–61
T.S.H. Driessen
Abstract
This paper is devoted to researching a general bankruptcy problem from a game
theoretic point of view, where the introduced game differs from the usual bankruptcy
game. The introduced game is a TU game for which the core and the prekernel are
analyzed. A long development is devoted to a study of the duality between TU
games and indirect functions.
Game Problems on Rotation Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62–74
N. Hovakimyan and L. Harutunian
Abstract
We consider differential games with simple motion of two points P (pursuer) and
E (evader) on the surface of one sheet of double-sheeted two-dimensional rotation
hyperboloid. We analyse geometrical properties of primary solition trajectories:
geodesics and optimal phase strusture. We also focus on the limit case of the
hyperboloid, the two-dimensional cone, consider games of pursuit and approach
and describe computer simulation results for this case.
Representation Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75–86
W. Kerby and F. Go¨beler
Abstract
Here we present a short theory of sum games and value functions on sum games.
We feel this theory is adequate to describe the power distribution of the members
of such a legislative body as determined by the voting system itself. Any economic,
military, political, social or cultural factors which may influence the decision making
process are ignored. The distribution of voting power as measured by Shapley
values is computed for the UN as it is presently structured. Also a generalization
of multilinear extensions is described which leads to a general construction method
for symmetric linear value functions. The classical Shapley and Banzhaf values are
constructable by this method.
On Probabilities of Pure Strategy n-Tuples
in Non-Cooperative Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87–93
V.L. Kreps and N.N. Vorob’ev
Abstract
Players mixed strategies taken as random trials with outcomes from the pure
strategy set are supposed in the non-cooperative game theory to be stochastically
independent. Stochastic independence is a quantitative relationship between prob-
abilities of outcomes and probabilities of their combination (the latter are the prod-
ucts of the former).
The authors suggest other functional expressions for probabilities of combination
of outcomes (other distributions over the set of pure strategy n-tuples) to be referred
to below as types of dependence. It is supposed that probabilities of combinations
of outcomes (probabilities of pure strategy n-tuples) are functions of probabilities
of outcomes (components of the mixed strategies corresponding to these outcomes).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the possibility of construction of the type
of dependence of large dimension via the type of dependence of the smaller ones,
in particular of dimension two. It is proved that reasonable suppositions pertaining
to the thus constructed type of dependence result in the unique type of dependence
that is the stochastic independence.
Strong (N − 1)-Equilibrium. Concepts and
Axiomatic Characterizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94–102
D.V. Kuzutin
Abstract
Using a specific approach to the coalitionconsistency analysis in nperson strategic
games we offer new Nashequilibria refinements: strong (n 1)equilibria and strictly
strong (n 1)equilibria. The relation between these solutions and other coalitionsta-
ble optimality principles (strong and strictly strong Nash equilibrium, coalitionproof
Nash equilibrium, semistrong Nash equilibrium) is established. We give the axiom-
atization of strong (n 1)-equilibrium for closed classes of strategic games in terms
of consistency, one-person rationality, suitable variants of converse consistency and
Pareto-optimality axiom and others.
An Optimal Stopping of Random Walks Game
with Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103–109
V.V. Mazalov and E.A. Kochetov
Abstract
Consider a game of two players determined by random walks of the following
form. Let xn and yn be independent symmetric random walks over the set E0 =
{0, 1, . . . , k}, beginning in state a and being absorbed at the ends with probability
p and with probability q = 1 − p reflecting from the state 0 and k into states
1 and k− 1, respectively. Players I and II observe the random walks xn and yn and
stop them at some random time τ and σ, respectively.
These random variables τ and σ, which we call the stopping times are the play-
ers’ strategies. If xτ > yσ, Player I wins and if xτ < yσ, Player II wins. But if
xτ = yσ a draw is declared. There is no information about the opponent’s behavior
at a player’s disposal. Here we find the equilibrium strategies for arbitrary p.
Note on the Core and Quasicore of Cooperative Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110–120
S. Pechersky
Abstract
n-person cooperative and cooperative fuzzy games with sidepayments are con-
sidered. We consider the class Γ of superlinear (i.e. positively homogeneous and
concave) fuzzy games and impose a set of axioms which defines a set-valued solution
on Γ, the core being the unique solution satisfying the set of axioms. As a corollary
of the corresponding uniqueness theorem we derive the analogous set of axioms for
standard cooperative games. This set of axioms is in a sense intermediate with
respect to Peleg’s and Keiding’s sets of axioms for the core. Finally, we define the
notion of quasicore for a game and discuss some properties of this solution, which
coincides with the Weber set for standard games, but appears in quite different
context.
A Unique Nash Solution for the Games with
Perfect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121–129
L.A. Petrosjan
Abstract
An extensive form game is said to have perfect information if the following two
conditions are satisfied: there are no simultaneous moves, and at each decision
point it is known which choices have previously been made. In games with perfect
information the subgame perfect equilibria can be found by dynamic programming,
i.e. by inductively working backwards in the game tree. But even in this case one
can find a wide class of Nash equilibria with different payoffs for the players. We
propose the refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based upon the preferences
of the players, giving the possibility of determining the unique Nash equilibrium in
the sense of the players’ payoffs. The approach is used for the calculation of the
unique Nash equilibrium in a differential ”lifeline game” of pursuit with one pursuer
and two evaders.
Nash-Hurwitz Equilibrium for Non-Cooperative
Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130–141
L.V. Smirnova
Abstract
Non-cooperative n-person games with vector payoffs and uncertainty implying
fuzziness in payoff functions are considered. A generalized equilibrium concept,
called Nash-Hurwitz equilibrium, is introduced. For games with scalarized payoff
functions equilibrium existence theorems are given for pure and mixed strategies
cases. Under the same conditions, the existence of a Slater-maximal Nash-Hurwitz
equilibrium is also shown. In addition to the above conditions, if the payoff functions
are concave, the paper further shows the existence of a guaranteed Nash-Hurwitz
equilibrium in pure strategies. In a two-person game with fuzzy linear quadratic
payoffs an equilibrium is found.
Unimprovable Arbitration Solution Under
Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142–151
K.S. Vaisman and S.S. Mishin
Abstract
A two-person bargaining problem under uncertainty without side payments is
considered. It is presupposed, that the players follow the bargaining model by Nash
and take into account a possibility of realization of any uncertainty. On the basis
of the analog of vector saddle point arbitration NashSlater solution of the game
is defined, and it is shown by example, that the set of such solutions is internally
unstable. The unimprovable guaranteeing arbitration sssolution of Nash for the
game as an internally stable solution is introduced; its properties and existence
conditions are studied.
Continuous Take-Away Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152–154
S.V. Vinnichenko
Abstract
Epp and Ferguson [1] give a solution to take-away games. In such games a
positive number m and a nondecreasing function f(n) are given. The first player
on his initial move can remove from a pile a positive number of counters n1, which
does not exceed m. On the next move, the second player can remove from the pile a
positive number of counters n2, which does not exceed f(n1), and so on. The player
removing the last counter wins the game. This game is a variant of the game NIM
(see, for example, [2]). In this paper similar continuous games are considered.
The Proper Sharley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155–159
N.N. Vorob’ev and A.V. Liapounov
Abstract
Kalai and Samet and independently of them Diubin have proposed to consider
the weighted Shapley Value as a solution to a class of cooperative games with a
finite set of players, which depends on both the characteristic function and a given
measure on the set of players. In this paper for a special class TU games, containing
the monotone ones, the notion of the Proper Shapley Value (PSV) is introduced as
a fixed point of a Shapley mapping, which transforms an imputation to a more fair
imputation. Thus the PSV is a solution, which depends only on the characteristic
function. It turns out that the PSV has an extremal property: it maximizes the
production function of Kobb-Douglas types on the set of the imputation.
On Communication in Cooperation Games: a Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160–173
O. Voshtina
Abstract
This survey gives generalizations of the Shapley value for the case when some of
the coalitions, including the grand coalition are not possible. For a graph restricted
game the Myerson value is given. It is shown that this value can be interpreted
in a manner similar to the Shapley value. For a game in partition function form
the definition of the position value and an extension of the Myerson are considered.
Also another extension of the Shapley value is given axiomatically.
Communication Can Ease Prisoners’ Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174–182
J. Watanabe
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to propose an extended game with a preplay ne-
gotiation in order to ease a two person prisoners’ dilemma. That is, we present an
explicit procedure that yields an efficient solution as its outcome.
The extended game is divided into the two stages: the preplay negotiation stage
and the action decision stage. At the beginning of the preplay negotiation stage,
the players face a 2 × 2 prisoners’ dilemma game. Each player proposes a third
strategy available for himself (or herself). A proposed strategy must be feasible in
the sense that it signifies voluntary transfer from one player to the other or free
disposal of some his (or her) payoff. Then, either a 2 × 2, 3 × 2, or 3 × 3 game
is chosen depending upon a conclusion of the negotiation. In the action decision
stage, the induced game created in the previous stage is given. And then the players
make nonbinding communication, coordinate their strategies as long as they are self-
enforcing, and obtain payoffs according to their correlated strategy.
It is shown that for some class of prisoners’ dilemma games efficient payoffs than
the noncooperative payoff of the original game can be obtained in the extended
game.
We introduce a two person prisoners’ dilemma game and briefly discuss the
equilibrium in the game. An extended game is presented using an example and the
result is proved formally.
Selectors of the Core and Consistency Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183–192
V.V. Zakharov and O-Hun Kwon
Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of existence of the core from linear pro-
gramming point of view and treat the concept of subcore. One of the most important
advantages of the linear programming approach is that the subcore may be repre-
sented in a simple analytical form. In addition, we can easily check the necessary
and sufficient conditions for all one point solutions like Shapley value, Banzaf value,
egalitarian nonseparable contribution value (ENSC value), etc., to be selectors of
the subcore. We also discuss in this paper the consistency property of the subcore
in reduced games due to Davis-Maschler, Moulin and Funaki. A general consistency
property of a solution is described as follows. Choose any payoff vector in a solu-
tion set for some game. Suppose that some coalition S want to renegotiate payoff
distribution among his members and may cooperate with other members outside S
paying for them agreed payoff. Such a process is described by a reduced game. The
solution is called consistent if it recommends the same payoff distribution for the
reduced game as initially. A consistent solution provides a stability of an agreement
against wishes of any coalition to renegotiate agreed upon payoff distribution. In
the last section we introduce and treat the grand subcore which is a generalization
of the subcore. We proved that subcore and grand subcore are S-consistent in DM-,
M- , and SIM- reduced games a special SC-condition holds.
